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ABSTRACT 
 
For as long as his work has been at the core of the safety profession, Herbert William 
Heinrich has been a staple of debate.  His 1931 work Industrial Accident Prevention: A 
Scientific Approach has sparked worldwide debate on the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of his safety theories, as well as the accuracy or inaccuracy of his 
research and methods. 
Heinrich’s work is undoubtedly cited time and again as the foundational teaching for 
behavior-based safety, as well as countless other teachings in the safety profession as a 
whole.  Despite the continued challenges to the validity of his work, there has been little 
research done to verify the accuracy or inaccuracy of his research and work.   
Nine years of data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) was compiled, spanning 
from 2006 to 2014.  The BLS data is broken down by ten (10) major categories reported 
to the BLS, which include Natural Resources and Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, 
Trade, Transportation and Utilities, Information, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, 
Professional and Business Services, Educational and Health Services, Leisure, 
Entertainment, and Hospitality, and Other Services.  This data was organized and 
charted in a way in which a descriptive statistical analysis could be performed to provide 
an industry-specific comparison of Heinrich’s theories versus real life. Findings from this 
research established the value of Heinrich’s Model in modern safety management. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Background 
Herbert William Heinrich was an employee of the engineering and inspection division of 
Traveler’s Insurance Company.  Heinrich drew his data from insurance claims he 
collected over his career with Traveler’s Insurance Company and compiled the data to 
form a theory, which he outlined in the first edition of his book.  In 1931, he published 
the book, Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach, in which he outlined a 
theory that for every incident that causes a major injury or fatality, there are 29 
incidents that cause minor injuries, and 300 that cause no injuries, which include 
property damage incidents and near-miss incidents.  His graphical representation of the 
data took the form of a pyramid, which has been referred to as “Heinrich’s Triangle”, 
“Heinrich’s Pyramid”, and also “Heinrich’s Law”. 
Heinrich believed that the vast majority of accidents were the result of “man failure”, or 
the unsafe acts of the worker.  His research surmised that such failure was the case 88% 
of the time.  In 10% of incidents, unsafe mechanical and/or physical conditions were 
believed to be the cause, while the remaining 2% of cases were unpreventable.  While in 
many cases, the root cause of an accident or incident can be traced back to the unsafe 
act of a worker, there are times that there was a factor that was beyond their control 
that led to the accident or incident occurring.   
Many who report on the work of Heinrich focus solely on the results of these “man-
failures”, and have used these results as the basis for behavior-based safety.  What is 
often overlooked by those concerned solely with controlling the workers is that Heinrich 
himself encouraged those involved in safety to focus on making the workplace safer as 
well.  In his 4th edition, Heinrich encouraged those involved in safety to not only educate 
the workers in a location on the need for them to do their jobs safely, but also for those 
involved in safety to focus on improving the safety level of the work environment for 
those workers.   
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Statement of the Problem 
The theory presented by Herbert Heinrich was taken from data collected from insurance 
claims filed with Traveler’s Insurance Company in the 1920’s.  Heinrich’s 300-29-1 ratio 
has been widely accepted and regarded as law.  Unfortunately, the original data used 
for Heinrich’s research has been lost, so a true statistical analysis to confirm or refute his 
findings cannot be done.  Because there is no data against which a true statistical 
analysis and comparison can be made, many safety professionals have taken one of two 
stances on his research.   
In the first group are the safety professionals who have taken Heinrich’s theories and 
applied them as law, using them as the foundation of modern safety teaching.  While 
they have seemingly done this with the best of intentions, their rigid application of 
Heinrich’s work has left little room for improvement upon those teachings.   
In the second group are those who disagree with the Heinrich’s premises.  This group of 
safety professionals tend to find the work of Heinrich to be flawed, and prefer to focus 
their safety efforts on developing a culture of safety in an organization in order to 
reduce the number of injuries and fatalities.   
The problem is that there has been little or no research done to try to fully confirm or 
refute the work of Herbert Heinrich.  Proponents of behavior-based safety attribute as 
much as 95% of work-related injuries to the unsafe acts of people.  Something that is 
often neglected is that the information on which Heinrich based his theory was obtained 
from documents that were filled out by supervisors, who generally blamed the worker 
for the injury that occurred, and did little investigation into the root-cause of the 
incident.   
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine the degree to which the work of Heinrich can 
be applied in modern safety management.  There has been much discussion as of late 
on the validity of Heinrich’s safety pyramid and its significance to the safety profession.  
Heinrich theorized that for every major injury or fatality event, there were 29 events 
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that resulted in minor injuries and 300 events that resulted in no injury, including 
property damage and near-miss events.  His theory has stood as the foundation of 
behavior-based safety, and has been taught abundantly in industry.  This study aims to 
take Heinrich’s model and use modern data collection to provide an industry-specific 
descriptive statistical analysis to determine whether or not his theory applies to today’s 
work environment. 
 
Potential Significance 
This study can assist in determining the applicability of the work of Heinrich in a 
contemporary environment.  The findings of this study can impact the future of 
behavior-based safety and can help define the trajectory of safety training in the future.   
 
Definition of Terms 
Bureau of Labor Statistics: The principal data collecting agency for the US government in 
the broad field of labor economics and statistics and serves as a principal agency of the 
US Federal Statistical System. 
Behavior-based safety: A process designed to influence employee actions toward safer 
outcomes, ideally by preventing an accident or injury before it occurs 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS): The standard used by Federal 
statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, 
analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy (US 
Census Bureau, 2016).  
 
Assumptions 
It is assumed that the data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics was reported 
accurately by those responsible for reporting injury and fatality data.  It is also assumed 
that the data was correctly entered into the database from which the data was 
collected.   
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Limitations 
1. The original data and research used by Herbert W. Heinrich is unavailable for 
further review, aside from the books written by Heinrich. 
2. Only injury and fatality data from the United States was used within the scope of 
this research. 
3. Only injury and fatality data from claims represented by Traveler’s Insurance 
Company were analyzed in Heinrich’s original work.  
4. Injury and fatality data in Heinrich’s original research were from claims that took 
place in the 1920’s. 
 
Organization of the Study 
This study is presented in chapters as follows: 
1. The introduction section provides the background for the study, along with an 
introduction that establishes the purpose of the study and the relevance of the 
research, analysis, and results. 
2. The literature review section provides a review of literature pertinent to the 
study.  This literature is comprised of works from members of the safety 
community, as well as researchers who have presented similar studies claiming 
to refute the validity of the work of Heinrich. 
3. The methodology section explains the methodology of the study, including how 
the data were collected and what methods were used to analyze them. 
4. The research findings and implications section includes statistical data that 
brings conclusion to this study.  This chapter presents the significance of the 
findings of the study, as well as recommendations for the safety profession 
moving forward. 
5. The discussion and implications section presents the implications of the study 
and their potential significance to the safety profession. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
Heinrich was one of the pioneers of modern industrial safety.  His work has been cited 
countless times throughout the history of the safety profession.  The ideas he presented 
in his book, Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach have prevailed in the 
safety profession for decades, being the foundation of modern theories of behavior-
based safety.  Smith (1999) questioned the validity of not only Heinrichian thought, but 
the concepts of behavior-based safety as a whole. 
The goal of behavior-based safety (BBS) is to transform the behaviors of workers from 
at-risk acts to safe acts (Smith, 1999).  Much of the logic behind BBS is derived from the 
psychological works of B. F. Skinner, who found consequences can either encourage or 
discourage certain behaviors.  The theory is that “punishment decreases the probability 
a behavior will be repeated” (Smith, 1999, p. 1).  Both positive and negative 
reinforcement can be used in BBS to change behaviors of workers.  It is theorized that 
negative reinforcement only encourages the minimum level of compliance, whereas 
positive reinforcement can encourage workers to exceed the minimum (Smith, 1999). 
One of the greatest problems with Heinrich’s theory is that it would not withstand the 
test of modern science (Smith, 1999).  Heinrich believed the vast majority of accidents 
occurred as a result of the unsafe action of a worker.  By focusing on this, and reducing 
the unsafe actions, the number of accidents should also decline.  According to Smith, 
however, faults in the elements of a system are the cause of most accidents.  By 
focusing on quality, rather than quantity, “the mental labor of all employees is needed 
to fix the system.” (Smith, 1999, p. 5) When all parties involved work together, including 
all levels of employees and stakeholders, the flaws in the system can be more easily 
identified and rectified, reducing the number of incidents, thereby reducing the overall 
number of accidents and injuries. 
According to Smith, BBS relies too heavily on external motivators to change behaviors, 
and that the “extrinsic motivators destroy the intrinsic motivation which is inherent in 
people to do good work and work safety.” (Smith, 1999, p. 5) A proponent of systems 
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(and quality) management, Smith feels that BBS has run its course, and the theories of 
Heinrich should be removed from the language of modern safety professionals.  The 
theories of quality management can be easily translated to the safety realm, such as in 
quality management everyone works together to achieve a common goal. 
Safety research continues to rely on the tenet that by reducing the number of “no 
harm” or “near miss” incidents, the overall number of major incidents will decrease as 
well.  Gallivan et al. (2008) studied the theory of Heinrich’s 1-29-300 ratio.  They tried to 
show whether or not the Heinrich ratio could be viewed as a constant, and whether or 
not the concept of his ratio was sound. They disagreed with Heinrich’s theory that 
“introducing measures to reduce the incidence of minor incidents will not inevitably 
reduce the incidence of major incidents”, further stating that, “any safety policies based 
on the assumption that the Heinrich ratio is true needs to be rethought (p. 637).” 
Health and Safety Practices on Christchurch’s Post-Earthquake Rebuild Projects: How 
Relevant is Heinrich’s Safety Pyramid 
Christchurch, New Zealand was struck by a major earthquake in 2011.  Seward and 
Kestle (2014) conducted a study on the relevance of the Heinrich Safety Pyramid in 
modern reconstruction projects, reiterating that Heinrich’s work was a theory, not a law 
as it has been referred to many times.  Heinrich supposed that a worker fatality most 
often would not have occurred without a foundation of less-severe incidents that led to 
the fatality.  By reducing the number of less-severe incidents, Heinrich believed that 
there would be a lower likelihood of the more severe incidents occurring. 
Reviewing accident data from rebuilding projects in Christchurch from 2013, Seward and 
Kestle felt that Heinrich’s safety pyramid was still relevant to the safety practices on 
construction sites.  Heinrich promoted two approaches to accident prevention, noting 
that, “accident prevention is both a science and art, and that a strict concentration on 
mathematical formulas and models do not create a safe environment.” (Heinrich, 1941, 
p. 364) The ratio revealed by Seward and Kestle was 1-5-20, much higher than the 
original Heinrich ratio.  At first glance, it would appear that the Heinrich ratio is not 
valid.  Heinrich’s original data was taken from insurance claim data that spanned several 
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different industries.  It is not uncommon for the construction industry to have a higher 
rate of injury than other industries and first-aid type injuries are not always reported. 
Both of these issues could have had an effect on the final results of the study (Seward & 
Kestle, 2014).  Of particular note in the Seward & Kestle study was that nearly 70,700 
safety conversations were reported, and self-reporting by survey respondents revealed 
that near-miss reporting was not always consistent, which could be another reason that 
the resulting ratio was not as close to the original Heinrich Theory.   
Frontline site workers and supervisors were asked during the study if they felt that the 
Heinrich pyramid was a useful visual tool to stress the importance of safety on the 
jobsite (Seward & Kestle, 2014).  They indicated the pyramid helped bring into 
perspective how important it is to accurately and fully report near-miss incidents, along 
with major and minor incidents, so as to help paint a fuller picture of the overall safety 
of the job site, and what the workers can do to help improve safety on-site. 
There have been calls industry-wide for the removal of Heinrich’s theories from safety 
teaching.  Many of those who are calling for this removal feel that the heavy emphasis 
on reducing minor incidents is leading down a path where there is not enough focus on 
major injuries and fatalities.  This is causing the safety profession to be back-loaded in 
prevention by not focusing on reducing the low-frequency, high-impact events. 
Lander et al. (2011) disagree with this new theory, feeling that from an injury prevention 
standpoint, it is essential to view near-miss incidents, minor injuries, and major injuries 
as having a common underlying cause and by preventing the near-miss incidents, safety 
professionals may in turn reduce the overall number of major incidents and fatalities.  
They revealed a significant decrease in the proportion of near miss and minor injuries 
between 2002 and 2005, encouraging reporting of all incidents by not assigning blame 
to anyone who reported an incident.  They also noted a significant trend for the 
proportion of OSHA recordable injuries compared to near-miss incidents.   
By using a near-miss reporting system, Lander et al. (2011) noted an overall decrease in 
the number of minor injuries and OSHA-recordable incidents, while noting a significant 
increase in near-miss incidents.  They did note that contrary to Heinrich’s theory, the 
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vast majority of events that were noted were minor injury cases, not no-injury cases, 
which Heinrich proposed with his 300-21-1 ratio.  Even with noting that the Heinrich 
Model may not be valid in its entirety, the focus shown by the near-miss reporting 
system held true with the spirit of Heinrich’s work.  The study revealed the need to 
study the causes of all events, and since near-miss and minor injuries occur more 
frequently, it is essential to ensure accurate reporting of these events in order to 
investigate the root cause of the events, thereby working to reduce the number of 
events, which will in turn reduce the number of major events. 
Johnson (2011) wrote that what is still under debate, however, is whether or not the 
influence of Heinrich is a good thing or a bad thing. She found that many safety 
professionals are calling for the debunking of the Heinrich Theory and for its removal 
from all safety language and training, citing its age and the continual question of 
whether his research would hold up to modern methods and peer-review.  She cited 
Manuele’s 2002 work “Heinrich Revisited: Truisms or Myths”, where Manuele noted 
that Heinrich revisited his 300-29-1 ratio in subsequent editions of his work, but failed 
to explain it outside of his 1931 first edition.  Also noted by Manuele was that Heinrich’s 
original data no longer exists, effectively preventing a true analysis of the work he 
performed. 
Some of the biggest opponents to Heinrich’s work note that focusing on “man-failure”, 
as is supposed by Heinrich suggesting that 88% of accidents occur due to the unsafe acts 
of man, lead safety professionals to focus too heavily on workers, rather than the 
systems in which they operate (Johnson, 2011).  Accidents often have multiple causes, 
not solely the failure of one person or piece of equipment, and should be investigated 
more diligently by safety professionals.   
Dislodging the long-held beliefs that Heinrich’s theories were laws is a daunting 
challenge for modern safety professionals.  Heinrich’s work should serve as a guideline 
for planning safety initiatives, but should not be the sole focus, as it leaves out an entire 
realm of possible hazards, including system design and overall culture (Johnson, 2011).  
The belief that the majority of accidents are the fault of the worker enables upper-level 
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management to simply insure against major losses as a result of an inevitable incident, 
and further keeps the safety profession from doing what it needs to do, which is better 
ensure the safety of the worker.  Because of this, many professionals call for the 
complete removal of Heinrich’s ideas.  Some professionals, however, feel that more 
research needs to be done, using Heinrich as a litmus test, but striving to advance the 
profession through professional research (Johnson, 2011). 
The work of Herbert Heinrich, although referred to as theory by himself, has been 
treated and referenced as a law by many safety professionals (Ward, 2012).  The title of 
“Law” vastly over-reaches the original intentions of Heinrich’s work, and in many cases 
can lead to confusion over just what Heinrich intended with his research.  Many 
opponents to Heinrich’s theories forget that Heinrich himself, though indicating that 
88% of accidents are a result of man-failure, recognized and noted that accidents result 
from a sequence of factors, not necessarily a single point of fault (Ward, 2012). 
Something that is also of interest to note is that Heinrich’s ratios have been so ingrained 
in modern safety thinking that they are treated as absolute constants.  Heinrich’s ratios 
only apply to the average case of a similar incident occurring to the same person 
(Heinrich, 1941).  Heinrich’s ratios are also often thought to be completely 
transcendent, applying to a small factory the same as a large factory, and a small sample 
size the same as a large sample size (Ward, 2012).  This is often not the case, which is 
why more research needs to be done to see how/if these ratios are still applicable to 
today’s workforce and workplace.   
The central question Ward (2012) addressed regarding Heinrich’s theory is if something 
has been missed.  From Heinrich’s work, much of which remained unchanged through 
four editions of his book, we can deduce that he held that a reduction in the minor 
incidents will result in a reduction in the major incidents.  Perhaps what has been 
missed by stating Heinrich’s theories as law is a way of seeing what Heinrich was saying: 
“if you have 300 near-misses, something more serious is probable; if you can reduce 
that number of minor incidents the probability of serious injury or damage is reduced; if 
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the number of minor events reaches zero that probability tends to zero - - - probably 
never reaching zero, but getting close.” (Ward, 2012, p. 5) 
Perhaps what Heinrich was trying to convey is that those responsible for safety need to 
be ever-vigilant, working to reduce the number of minor incidents, encouraging the 
reporting of near-miss incidents, and helping to find the root-cause of any incident, 
whether major or minor (Ward, 2012).  What many who want Heinrich’s ideas removed 
from safety nomenclature get pigeonholed into remembering is the arithmetic of 
Heinrich’s model.  What they often fail to do is look deeper than the numbers and 
realize that Heinrich himself did not just focus on the numbers, but the people 
represented by those numbers (Ward, 2012). 
Safety practitioners have a long-held belief that frequency breeds severity (Mattis, 
2011).  This belief has morphed into many ideologies in the safety profession, but stems 
from the work of Heinrich.  Modern safety professionals place major injuries and 
fatalities at the top of the pyramid model used by Heinrich, and strive to reduce the 
number of minor incidents and no-injury incidents that are displayed at the bottom of 
the pyramid, all with the hope of reducing or eliminating the major incidents and 
fatalities (Mattis, 2011). 
Mattis (2011) goes on to cite Manuele (2006), a well-respected researcher, author, and 
safety professional.  Taking from Manuele’s work, Mattis noted there was a 23% 
increase in cases of more than 31 days away from work from 1995 to 2001, despite 
significant decreases in cases where days away from work were anywhere from 1 to 20 
days.  This seems to be contrary to what Heinrich was proposing with his triangle. 
Many executives often rely solely on OSHA injury rates, or large penalties, to assess 
their overall safety performance.  When something catastrophic does occur, especially 
at a location with a low overall injury rate, many of the executives are caught off-guard 
and chalk it up to chance (Krause, 2011).  What is often cited is that the company was 
operating under the premise of Heinrich’s 1931 theory that by reducing the number of 
minor incidents, the company would be able to eliminate, or at least drastically reduce, 
the occurrence of major incidents. 
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Krause (2011) stated that the root cause for major incidents lies not in the Heinrich 
Theory of frequency breeds severity, but rather in the entire metric by which safety is 
measured as a whole.  Heinrich’s theories have been debunked by current Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) data, which has shown a decrease in the number of minor 
incidents, but the more serious injuries and fatalities rates’ have remained constant, 
even showing increases in some cases (Krause, 2011). 
Krause (2011) also noted that proper identification of factors leading up to a serious 
injury or fatality (SIF) needs to be a priority.  According to Krause, many SIF’s have 
identifiable precursors, and assuming that the conditions that led to the SIF have never 
previously occurred is a fatal flaw in the thought process of safety professionals.  Safety 
professionals should look beyond the numbers, realize that Heinrich was wrong, and 
work to develop new and better methods of prevention.  Process safety needs to be 
better understood, and the culture of the organization should reflect the desire for top 
leadership to do more to prevent SIF’s (Krause, 2011). 
Despite efforts of safety professionals and corporate leadership to reduce the number 
of accidents in the workplace to zero, accidents still occur.  More often than not, the 
cause is not as simplistic as the failure of one person on the job, but rather a series of 
minor failures, or lapses in judgement or enforcement, that lead to a greater failure 
down the line (Freibott, 2012).  For the modern, proactive incident manager or safety 
professional, the message needs to be that learning from past mistakes gives only a 
small view of what is truly needed in a company.  A better understanding of what is 
going on throughout the company is needed in order to evolve the safety culture at the 
company (Freibott, 2012). 
Heinrich’s Law states that for every incident that results in a major injury or fatality, 
there will have been 29 incidents that caused a minor injury, and 300 incidents that 
resulted in no injury (Freibott, 2012).  Frank Bird took Heinrich’s model a little farther, 
noting that a pyramid with a ratio of 1-10-30-600 was more likely to appear, with one 
reported major injury for every 10 reported minor injuries, 30 incidents resulting in 
property damage, and 600 near-miss incidents (Freibott, 2012).  Conoco Phillips Marine 
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also further studied the issue, revealing that for every fatality, there was an underlying 
number of 300,000 at-risk behaviors (Freibott, 2012).   
The most important thing for safety practitioners to take from the three studies is that 
proactive safety management must be in place and prepared to analyze all incidents.  
Transparent reporting is essential, and safety management cannot be satisfied with 
merely lopping off the top of the iceberg; they should focus on getting to the root of the 
iceberg and attacking it from below (Freibott, 2012).   
Accident Losses Elimination By Means of Safety Pyramid Analysis 
While safety professionals continue to call for the debunking of the work of Heinrich, it 
is difficult to discount the foundation that was laid by Heinrich.  Many safety 
practitioners and safety management professionals have held the theories of Heinrich as 
law, believing that the ratios presented in the Heinrich safety pyramid of 300:29:1 will 
hold true in any event.  Those who are against this line of thinking feel that the time for 
focusing on high-frequency, low-risk events has passed, and more focus needs to be on 
preventing high-risk, low-frequency events.  Radvanska (2010) stated the focus needs to 
be a more balanced approach, and that focusing too heavily on the major incidents is 
also a cause for concern, when there are many more significant opportunities to provide 
a better basis and better control of major incidents at the bottom of the pyramid.   
Since Heinrich’s original 1931 study, there has been more and better data accumulated, 
and research continues to be done to this day on safety-related incidents.  As this data 
has been accumulated, it has revealed that the triangle model presented by Heinrich 
may not actually be an equilateral triangle, depending on the safety culture of the 
individual company in which it is used (Radvanska, 2010).  A great example lies within a 
company that places blame on its workers for incidents.  They may have far fewer minor 
injuries, but in turn may have a higher rate of major injuries, as the culture at the 
company discourages reporting of the minor incidents, thereby effectively eliminating 
opportunities for subsequent events to be investigated and solved (Radvanska, 2010).   
The top-down focus of management in relation to Heinrich’s pyramid is a cause for 
concern.  Safety management needs to be a balanced approach of preventing fatal 
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accidents, in addition to preventing the unsafe acts that often lead to fatal incidents.  
Heinrich theorized that all accidents occur as a result of multiple causes, and after 
determining the physical circumstance that led to the injury event, investigation needs 
to continue upstream from the event to reveal all of the factors that led to it.  Many 
companies, however, choose to stop at the physical cause of the incident to avoid 
litigation, doing a disservice to the employees and families affected by the incident 
(Radvanska, 2010).   The numbers used in the pyramid presented by Heinrich have never 
been scientifically validated, even though the concept has been held in high regard by 
safety professionals for many years.  Those who are skeptical of the validity of the 
Heinrich Model feel that the data shown by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) refutes 
the Heinrich Theory (Nash, 2008). 
The BLS data showed an increase in the number of fatal work injuries between 2005 and 
2006, but showed a fatality rate that remained constant for the same period (Nash, 
2008).  Based on the Heinrich Model, one would have expected the rate to increase 
along with the number of fatalities.  Because of this discrepancy, it is important for 
safety professionals to change their view on incident investigations and subsequent 
corrective actions, employee behavior and risk management, and engineering controls 
(Nash, 2008).  Manuele has written extensively on the field of safety.  His 2011 work 
called for the removal of Heinrich’s theories from the safety profession.  Manuele noted 
that Heinrich’s original sources have been lost to time, and only the first four editions of 
his book Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach remain.  There is no way 
to determine how Heinrich gathered his information, the quality of the information he 
obtained, or how effective his data analytics were.  The work of Heinrich would not 
stand up to modern peer-review, and much of his terminology he used would be 
considered sexist by today’s standards (Manuele, 2011). 
Manuele also noted that Heinrich’s work focused very heavily on applied psychology, 
noting that many safety practitioners could effectively apply the psychological emphasis 
of Heinrich in their daily accident prevention efforts (2011).  Heinrich attributed 88% of 
the causes of accidents to “man-failure,” and felt that psychology was an important 
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element in remedying those problems (Heinrich, 1931).  Heinrich advocated for 
prevention of the first proximate cause, which was generally the easiest to correct, of an 
accident (Heinrich, 1931).  Manuele (2011) noted that this focus does not account for 
the dynamic, complex environment in which incidents occur, and that focusing only on 
the first cause of an accident does a disservice to those affected by the accident, citing 
the complex natures of both the Columbia incident in 2003 and the Deepwater Horizons 
explosion from 2010.   
Heinrich stated, “The natural conclusion follows, moreover, that in the largest injury 
group-the minor injuries-lies the most valuable clues to accident causes (Heinrich, 1931, 
p. 95).”  When the focus is placed too heavily on the failures of workers as a root-cause 
of an accident, management is often let off the hook as a causal factor, as blaming the 
workers is the path of least resistance.  There are often several causal factors of an 
accident, including cultural factors within the organization that are not often accounted 
for by a superficial investigation (Manuele, 2011).  It is true that human errors at the 
worker level do account for a large portion of the incident causes, but what is not often 
taken into consideration is the failures of management that have allowed both unsafe 
environments and unsafe practices to continue.  There are also maintenance factors and 
design factors that need to be accounted for, and a comprehensive incident 
investigation is the only way to uncover all of these causes, not just those of “man 
failure” (Manuele, 2011). 
Heinrich’s work has major flaws, not the least of which being the lack of availability of 
his original data and research.  Heinrich worked for an insurance company, and his data 
was taken from insurance claims files and the records of plant owners.  Manuele stated 
from his own research that insurance claim forms and supervisors’ reports were used as 
possible sources for data, but in more than 80% of the reports, there was insufficient 
data to glean any causal data (2011).  Another weakness in Heinrich’s work lies in the 
revision of data in his fourth edition in 1959 from his first edition, in which Heinrich 
changed the statement “a most interesting and absorbing study” to “a study of over 
5,000 cases” when he explained how he reached his 300-29-1 ratio (Manuele, 2011).   
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Heinrich also made several changes, subtle revisions, to his original data in subsequent 
editions, leading Manuele (2011) to question the validity of his original data.  Manuele 
stated, “How does one support using the ratios without having explanations of the 
differing interpretation Heinrich gives in each edition?” (p. 58) Also, Heinrich himself put 
limitations on his research, with the need for so many incidents of the same type 
occurring to the same person, and Maneuel doubted that there was a database of the 
more than 4,500 no-injury cases that would be necessary in order to make the Heinrich 
ratios plausible from Heinrich’s research. 
Manuele (2011) noted that a 2005 paper from the National Council on Compensation 
Insurance (NCCI) stated “There has been a larger decline in the frequency of smaller 
lost-time claims than in the frequency of larger lost-time claims,” which would run 
counter to the argument of Heinrich, which would have supposed an equal 
proportionate reduction in larger lost-time claims.  In relation to major incidents, 
Manuele notes that when small incidents are managed effectively, the small incident 
rate improves, but the large incident rate may remain the same, or increase in some 
instances.   
Because there is no sound basis to the 300-21-1 ratio presented by Heinrich, the issue is 
whether or not the ratio has substance.  The complex nature of the accident sequence 
must be accounted for, and it must stand to reason that not all hazards have an equal 
potential for harm.  Many safety practitioners have misconstrued Heinrich’s original 
intentions and terminology, and have adapted his theories as laws.  It is also of note that 
Heinrich indicated that any injury requiring more than first aid was considered to be a 
major injury (Manuele, 2011).  The culture of an organization is a major factor in 
incidents, and only if the culture as a whole improves will any major changes occur.  
Systemic problems must be identified and addressed, and employee training and 
empowerment are essential factors to the culture change.  Those who refer to 
Heinrich’s premises as fact are doing a great disservice to the safety profession 
(Manuele, 2011).   
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 
Context of the Study 
The work of Heinrich has been under fire for the last several years.  His 1930’s research 
has been lost, but his principles and axioms have been used as the foundation of 
modern safety teaching.  Due to the questions being raised about Heinrich’s research, 
this researcher complied data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the years of 
2006 to 2014 regarding the rates of other recordable incidents, restricted work, lost 
time, and fatality incidents.  Descriptive statistics were used to determine whether or 
not the work of Herbert Heinrich has any degree of applicability to today.  This 
researcher hopes to show ways in which safety teaching and methods can be improved 
upon.   
 
Research Question 
The overarching question of this research was: To what degree does the Heinrich Model 
apply to modern safety management? 
 
Data Collection 
The data collected for this research was extracted from BLS data collected from 2006 
through 2014 from the BLS website using the primary industry sector from the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  Using these NAICS codes, rates were 
collected for other recordable incidents, restricted work, lost time, and fatality incidents 
across ten primary industry sectors.  As opposed to utilizing Heinrich’s categories, BLS 
categories provided data that remains in the spirit of escalating categories of severity. 
The ten primary industry sectors were: 
1. Natural Resources and Mining 
2. Construction 
3. Manufacturing 
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4. Trade, Transportation, and Utilities 
5. Information 
6. Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
7. Professional and Business Services 
8. Educational and Health Services 
9. Leisure, Entertainment, and Hospitality 
10. Other Services 
Rather than using the total number of occurrences in each of the four types of incidents 
across all ten industries, incident rates were used in order to provide a more 
appropriate comparison of data from year to year.  BLS rates shown for fatalities are 
based on a constant of 200,000,000 hours worked, whereas the constant of 200,000 
was utilized in calculating other recordable, restricted work, and lost time rates.   
 
Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to determine the percentage of improvement or 
regression in the overall rate of other recordable, restricted work, lost time, and fatality 
incidents over the nine-year period covered by this research.  The BLS data calculated 
the rates as follows: 
For injuries, the rates represented the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time 
workers, calculated as (N/EH) x 200,000, where N= the total number of injuries and 
illnesses, EH= the total number of hours worked by employees in each category in the 
calendar year, and 200,000 serves as the base for 100 full-time-equivalent (FTE) 
workers.  FTE workers represent workers working 40 hours per week for 50 weeks 
during the year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).  
For fatalities, the rates represented the number of fatal occupational injuries per 
100,000 full-time workers, calculated as (N/EH) x 200,000,000, where N= the number of 
fatal work injuries, EH= the total number of hours worked by all employees during the 
calendar year, and 200,000,000 serves as the base for 100,000 FTE workers (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2015).
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Chapter Four 
Research Findings and Analysis 
When evaluating the percentage of improvement across the four categories of other 
recordable, restricted work, lost time, and fatality rates within each of the ten industry 
categories, the following percentages of improvement across the nine-year period 
investigated within the scope of this research were found (See Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Improvement across Incident Categories 
Industry Sector Other 
Recordable 
Restricted 
Work 
Lost Time Fatality 
Natural Resources and 
Mining 
32% 0% 24% 22% 
Construction 41% 40% 41% 13% 
Manufacturing 37% 37% 29% 15% 
Trade, Transportation, 
and Utilities 
33% 23% 19% 14% 
Information 33% 50% 14% 37% 
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate 
13% 0% 20% 8% 
Professional and 
Business Services 
36% 25% 29% 18% 
Educational and Health 
Services 
27% 27% 21% 30% 
Leisure, Entertainment, 
and Hospitality 
25% 14% 9% 23% 
Other Services 20% 20% 0% 4% 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015 
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Looking first at the major Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) category of Natural Resources 
and Mining, the data revealed a 32% improvement in the rate of other recordable 
incidents over the nine-year period.  This was followed by no change in restricted work 
incident rate, but the rate of lost time incidents improved by 24% and the fatality rate 
improved by 22%.  
It is interesting to note that Natural Resources and Mining contains industries that are 
often viewed as inherently more dangerous than many other industries.  While there 
was no improvement in the restricted work incident rate, there were strong 
improvements in the rates of other recordable, lost time, and fatality incidents.  As 
Heinrich surmised, the improvements at the base of the pyramid (other recordable 
incidents within the scope of this research) does appear to correspond with a decrease 
in serious (lost time) and fatal incidents. 
In Construction, there was a 41% improvement in other the recordable incident rate, a 
40% improvement in the restricted work incident rate, a 41% improvement in lost time 
incident rate, and a 13% improvement in fatality incident rate.  
In much the same manner as Natural Resources and Mining, Construction is an industry 
that is viewed as inherently more dangerous than many other industries.  There have 
been major improvements in the safety practices in the construction industry, which is 
evidenced by the strong improvements in incident rates across all four categories.  The 
reduction in the number of less-severe incident rate appears to correspond with a 
reduction in more severe incident rates. 
In Manufacturing, there was a 37% improvement in the other recordable incident rate, a 
37% improvement in the restricted work incident rate rate, a 29% improvement in the 
lost time incident rate, and a 15% improvement in the fatality incident rate.  
The trend in Manufacturing is much the same as those demonstrated in the categories 
of Natural Resources and Mining and in Construction.  Once again, strong improvements 
in the incident rate in the less severe incidents appear to have a corresponding 
decreases in the rates of the more severe incidents.   
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In Trade, Transportation, and Utilities, there was a 33% improvement in the other 
recordable incident rate, a 23% improvement in the restricted work incident rate, a 19% 
improvement in the lost time incident rate, and a 14% improvement in the fatality rate. 
Again, there appears to a corresponding reduction in more severe incident rates with a 
reduction in the less severe incident rates. 
Information experienced a 33% improvement in the other recordable incident rate, a 
50% improvement in the restricted work incident rate, a 14% improvement in the lost 
time incident rate, and a 37% improvement in the fatality incident rate.  
For the category of Information, the rates of incidents are considerably lower than the 
rates of other industries, but the reductions in rates are just as interesting to see.  As 
has been seen in the other industry categories, the improvements in the rates of other 
recordable and restricted work incidents appear to have corresponding improvements 
in the more severe categories of lost time and fatal injury incident rates.  
In Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, there was a 13% improvement in the other 
recordable incident rate.  There was no improvement in the restricted work incident 
rate, but there was a 20% improvement in the lost time incidents rate and an 8% 
improvement in the fatality incident rate. 
In this category, there is a bit of an interesting trend in the fatality rate.  Overall, there 
has been an improvement, but in recent years in the data, there was a spike in the 
fatality rate.  Until newer data is available, it is unclear if this is indeed a trend, or an 
anomaly in the data.   
In Professional and Business Services there was a 36% improvement in the other 
recordable incident rate.  There was a 25% improvement in the restricted work incident 
rate, a 29% improvement in lost time incidents, and an 18% improvement in the fatality 
incident rate. 
Professional and business services appears to indicate a corresponding reduction in the 
more severe incidents with a reduction in the less severe incidents. This experience is 
within the spirit of the Heinrich Model. 
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Educational and Health Services yielded a 27% improvement in the other recordable and 
restricted work incident rates.  There was a 21% improvement in the lost time incident 
rate and a 30% improvement in the fatality rate. 
Leisure, Entertainment, and Hospitality realized a 25% improvement in the other 
recordable incident rate.  In the restricted work incident rate, there was a 14% 
improvement.  There was a 9% improvement in the lost time incident rate and a 23% 
improvement in the fatality rate. 
In Services, there was a 20% improvement in the other recordable incident rate.  The 
restricted work rate improved 20%, but there was no improvement in the lost time rate.  
The fatality rate improved 4%. 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion and Implications 
One of Heinrich’s premises supported by this research is that by working to reduce the 
number of less-severe incidents, there can be a reduction of more severe incidents and 
fatalities.  While the reason for this is a topic for additional research, one can reasonably 
infer that a reduction in the rate of the less severe incident rate (other recordable), 
more severe incident rate reductions tend to occur. This conclusion is supported by 
taking a closer look at the data as broken out in the tables below. 
 
Though there is not a uniform reduction in rates across all four categories as might be 
expected by the Heinrich Model, these data do point to corresponding reductions in 
rates building from greater reductions in other recordable rates to smaller reductions in 
fatality rates. This finding is at least within the spirit of what the Heinrich Model was 
designed to communicate (See Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Industry Sectors most Closely Aligning with the Heinrich Model 
Industry Sector Other 
Recordable 
Restricted 
Work 
Lost Time Fatality 
Construction 41% 40% 41% 13% 
Manufacturing 37% 37% 29% 15% 
Trade, Transportation, 
and Utilities 
33% 23% 19% 14% 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015 
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These four industry categories demonstrated improvement in all four categories of 
incidents, but there is no consistency in the improvement as the data are evaluated 
beginning with other recordable rates moving up through the categories to the most 
severe, fatality rates. For example, Information data present a “see-saw” effect in that 
the other recordable rate indicates a 33% improvement, the restricted work rate 
improvement increases to 50%, the lost time rate improvement dips to 14%, and the 
fatality rate improvement rebounds to 37%. Still, in keeping with the spirit of the 
Heinrich Model, these industry categories do indicate that when lesser incident rates 
improve, there is a corresponding improvement in other categories of incidents (See 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Industry Sectors with Moderate Alignment with the Heinrich Model 
Industry Sector Other 
Recordable 
Restricted 
Work 
Lost Time Fatality 
Information 33% 50% 14% 37% 
Professional and 
Business Services 
36% 25% 29% 18% 
Educational and Health 
Services 
27% 27% 21% 30% 
Leisure, Entertainment, 
and Hospitality 
25% 14% 9% 23% 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015 
 
The industry categories in Table 4 appear to indicate a lesser alignment with the 
Heinrich Model in that they each experienced no improvement in one measured 
category. However, there does appear to be a corresponding improvement in fatality 
rates when there is an improvement in other recordable rates (See Table 4). 
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Table 4: Industry Sectors with Less Alignment with the Heinrich Model 
Industry Sector Other 
Recordable 
Restricted 
Work 
Lost Time Fatality 
Natural Resources and 
Mining 
32% 0% 24% 22% 
Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate 
13% 0% 20% 8% 
Other Services 20% 20% 0% 4% 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015 
  
This research opens many doors for further research.  First, further research would help 
explain the apparent spikes in fatality rates in industries that are viewed as inherently 
less dangerous than others.  One example would be the spikes in fatalities in 
Information; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; and Professional and Business 
Services.   
Another point for further research would be the effectiveness and methods of training 
in the industries that revealed significant and consistent reductions in the rates in all 
four categories, such as Construction, Manufacturing, and Trade, Transportation, and 
Utilities. 
Additionally, safety and health management system and risk assessment inclusion could 
be investigated to determine the degree to which such tools have impacted the data 
collected in this research. It could be assumed that the Heinrich Model is predicated on 
the concept that organizations are actively working to protect workers. Investigating the 
manifestation of such activity (or lack thereof) within various industrial sectors could 
explain the variances from the Heinrich Model that are indicated in the data.
25 
 
REFERENCES 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2012, October 25). Occupational Injuries and Illnesses 
 (Annual) News Release. Retrieved May 14, 2016, from 
 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/osh_10252012.htm  
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2015, September 17). Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 
 Summary, 2014. Retrieved May 14, 2016, from 
 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm  
Freibott, B. (2012). Sustainable Safety Management: Incident Management as a 
 Cornerstone for a Successful Safety Culture. Retrieved 2016, from 
 http://www.asse.org/assets/1/7/BerndFreibottArticle.pdf  
Gallivan, S., Taxis, K., Franklin, B. D., & Barber, N. (2008). Is the Principle of a Stable 
 Heinrich Ratio a Myth?. Drug safety, 31(8), 637-642. 
Heinrich, H. W. (1941). Industrial Accident Prevention. A Scientific Approach. Industrial 
 Accident Prevention. A Scientific Approach., (Second Edition). 
Johnson, A. (2011). Examining the foundation-Were Herbert William Heinrich's theories 
 valid, and do they still matter?. SH-Safety and Health-National Safety 
 Council, 184(4), 62. 
Krause, T. (2011, October 1). Accidents just happen? Retrieved 2016, from 
 http://www.ishn.com/articles/91809-accidents-just-happen  
Lander, L., Eisen, E. A., Stentz, T. L., Spanjer, K. J., Wendland, B. E., & Perry, M. J. (2011). 
 Near‐miss reporting system as an occupational injury preventive intervention in 
 manufacturing. American journal of industrial medicine, 54(1), 40-48. 
Manuele, F. A. (2011). Reviewing Heinrich: Dislodging two myths from the practice of 
 safety. Professional Safety, 56(10), 52-61. 
Mattis, G. T. (2011, January). Severity Study in Reverse: Testing Heinrich’s Safety 
 Pyramid. In ASSE Professional Development Conference and Exposition. American 
 Society of Safety Engineers. 
Nash, J. (2008, November 4). EHS Worldwide Horizons: Preventing death on the job. 
 Retrieved January 3, 2016, from http://www.ishn.com/articles/87745-ehs-
 worldwide-horizons-preventing-death-on-the-job  
26 
 
Radvanska, A. (2010). Accident losses elimination by means of safety pyramid 
 analysis. Annals of faculty engineering Hunedoara. Int J Eng. 2010; 8 (1): 73, 6.  
Seward, M., & Kestle, L. (2014). Health and safety practices on christchurch’s post-
 earthquake rebuild projects: How relevant is heinrich’s safety pyramid. 
Smith, T. A. (1999). What’s wrong with behavior-based safety. Professional Safety, 44(9), 
 37-40. 
US Census Bureau. (n.d.). North American Industry Classification System. Retrieved June 
 19, 2016, from http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/index.html 
US Census Bureau. (2007). Reference Materials. Retrieved June 19, 2016, from 
 http://www2.census.gov/econ2007/Reference_materials/htm 
 files/amdsdesc.htm 
Ward, R. B. (2012). Revisiting Heinrich's law. Chemeca 2012: Quality of life through 
 chemical engineering: 23-26 September 2012, Wellington, New Zealand, 1179 
 
 
